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It is difficult to believe that only a few months ago, the Arab Spring was broadly compared to the 
changes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union of the late 1980s and early 1990s.  
Today it seems as though stories of growing illiberalism in the new regimes in countries such as 
Egypt as well as the possibilities of Islamist forces taking a larger role in the near future have 
outweighed the sense of hope that dominated the Arab Spring narrative earlier in the year. 
 
Nonetheless, it is still too early to write off the liberalizing potential of the Arab Spring.  
Democracy rarely comes quickly or entirely smoothly so while it will not be easy for countries 
emerging from decades of authoritarian rule to rapidly transition to democracies, slow but 
definitive democratic change is certainly within the realm of possibility in Egypt, Libya and 
elsewhere in North Africa. 
 
While the Arab Spring presents an interesting moment for democratic development, they also 
present a critical test for the western democracy assistance project.  Democracy assistance, in 
recent decades has demonstrated an impressive capacity to help bring about regime change, as in 
the Color Revolutions in the former Soviet Union, as well as to consolidate democratic gains in 
countries following the collapse of an authoritarian regime as in post-Communist Poland, 
Hungary, Estonia and elsewhere.  However, democracy assistance policies have rarely been able 
to do both of these things in the same country, and may not be able to do either in North Africa.  
Following the Color Revolutions, democratic development proved very difficult in Georgia, 
Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan despite ample western democracy assistance.  Similarly, the democratic 
breakthroughs which lead to the collapse of Communism were due largely to domestic issues and 
global political factors rather than democracy assistance per se. 
 
With regards to North Africa, western democracy assistance proved to be a minor player in the 
recent breakthroughs.  Although democracy assistance organizations were active in Egypt and 
elsewhere in the months and years leading up to the Arab Spring, support for these organizations 
was outweighed by such a substantial degree by western support for the authoritarian regimes, 
that the west, and the U.S. in particular, has been broadly viewed in the region, probably 
accurately, as being responsible for keeping the old regime in place for so long rather than for 
helping accelerate its downfall. 
 
Although western democracy assistance may have played a small role in the Arab Spring 
uprisings, there is still ample time for these programs to have an impact on democratic transition 
and consolidation.  For the democracy assistance project to be successful in North Africa and 
demonstrate its ongoing relevance after what has been a difficult few years not only must these 
countries move towards democracy, but democracy assistance must play a meaningful role in 
this process.  If the initial potential of the Arab Spring gives way to a spate of new semi-
authoritarian and authoritarian countries, perhaps with a larger Islamist influence, it will be a 
blow to the idea that democracy is still expanding, thus bringing into question the efficacy of 
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continuing to fund democracy assistance.  Similarly, if one or more of these countries becomes 
notably more democratic, but does it while eschewing western democracy assistance, it will raise 
different, but equally significant questions about the necessity of the policy. 
 
This test of the relevance and the impact of democracy assistance is exacerbated by a growing 
concern in the U.S. and Europe about the value and cost of various aspects of foreign policy.  
Although, democracy assistance programs are not expensive at all, this alone is no longer enough 
to justify their continuation to ordinary citizens and legislators alike.  Democratic outcomes in 
which western democracy assistance play a real and visible role at least somewhere in North 
Africa may be an high threshold, even an unrealistic goal for democracy assistance 
organizations, but that may be what it takes to rebuild confidence in this work and its value. 
